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Commodities: Futures Control: Manipulation
Under the Commodity Exchange Act
The Department of Agriculture is charged with the en-
forcement of the Commodity Exchange Act,' and this mandate
is carried out by the Department through the Commodity Ex-
change Authority (CEA). 2 In response to complaints charging
price manipulation in the May, 1963 wheat futures market on
the Chicago Board of Trade, the CEA in June, 1964 brought
charges of violation of the Act against Cargill, Inc., one of the
world's largest grain traders, and several of its officers. Car-
gill had begun to establish a "long" or buyer's position in the
May futures market on April, 15, 1963. By May 21, 1963, this
amounted to 1,990,000 bushels, slightly short of the maximum
speculative limit. During May, Cargill also completed two prof-
itable sales of wheat to Spain, leaving only 50,000 bushels of soft
red winter wheat on the Chicago market.3  This class is the
cheapest grade, the class deliverable at par in satisfaction of fu-
tures contracts, and the ordinary trading stock of the Chicago
May futures market.4  On May 21, fifteen minutes before the
trading in May futures was due to end for the day, Cargill trans-
mitted to its broker a liquidation order on its long position re-
questing prices seven to eight cents above the price at which the
May future was then trading.5 This request was within a frac-
1. 49 Stat. 1491 (1936), as amended 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
The legislative history and purposes of the Act are discussed in detail
in Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange Act,
26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 215 (1958).
2. Although the Act provides that the Commodity Exchange
Commission shall exercise the regulatory powers, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1970),
the Commodity Exchange Authority performs the usual regulatory
functions. 29 Fed. Reg. 16211 (1964). See Flavin, The Function of
the Judicial Officer, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 26 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 227 (1958). See also Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of
the Commodity Exchanges and the National Securities Commissions,
38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 223 (1969).
3. Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1159-60 (8th Cir. 1971).
4. Id. at 1157.
5. At 11:45, the future was trading at $2.20. Cargill then trans-
mitted to its broker the following sell order:
200,000 bushels at $2.27
200,000 bushels at $2.27%
300,000 bushels at $2.27
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tion of a cent of the high price limit for the day which, under
the Board of Trade rules, is ten cents above or below the pre-
vious day's closing price. In the resulting confusion and con-
gestion 420,000 bushels of outstanding futures contracts remained
open after trading ended. This congestion was subsequently
liquidated, with Cargill's co-operation, through an exchange
agreement developed by officers of the Chicago Board of Trade
whereby Cargill sold warehouse receipts to unresolved shorts in
order to clear the May wheat future.
The CEA hearings lasted more than six years,0 and on August
18, 1970, the Secretary of Agriculture entered an order finding
that defendants had manipulated the market price of wheat fu-
tures in violation of sections 6(b) and 9 of the Commodity Ex-
change Act.7 On appeal of this order,8 the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the CEA had acted reasonably in concluding
that the evidence supported findings that defendants had inten-
tionally created and exploited a "squeeze" condition in the May
futures market and that such action was prohibited "manipula-
tion" within the meaning of the Act. Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S.Ct. 1170 (1972).
400,000 bushels at $2.27%
500,000 bushels at $2.28
390,000 bushels at $2.28%
452 F.2d at 1160.
6. The sanctions proposed were suspended because of the undue
protraction of the proceedings and because Cargill had apparently been
relying on the authority of Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52
(5th Cir. 1962). See notes 23-25 infra; 452 F.2d at 1156.
7. Section 6(b) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9, provides:
If the Secretary of Agriculture has reason to believe that any
person (other than a contract market) is manipulating or at-
tempting to manipulate or has manipulated or attempted to
manipulate the market price of any commodity ... he may
serve upon such person a complaint stating his charges in that
respect .... requiring such person to show cause why an order
should not be made prohibiting him from trading on or sub-ject to the rules of any contract market ....
Section 9 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13 (b), provides:
It shall be a felony punishable by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution, for any person to manip-
ulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in
interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the
rules of any contract market, or to corner or attempt to corner
any such commodity ....
8. 7 U.S.C. § 9 provides that after "the issuance of the order by
the Secretary of Agriculture, the person against whom it is issued may
obtain a review of such order or such other equitable relief as to the
court may seem just by filing in the United States court of appeals of
the circuit in which the petitioner is doing business a written petition
praying that the order of the Secretary of Agriculture be set aside."
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Some knowledge of the basic mechanics of the commodity
futures market is required to perceive and understand the is-
sues litigated in this case.9 A commodity future contract is an
agreement between a buyer and a seller that the buyer will pur-
chase from the seller a specified quantity of a commodity at a
specified price, with delivery of the commodity at a designated
month in the future. The clearing organization of the Board of
Trade is substituted as buyer from the seller and as seller to the
buyer; thereafter each is obligated only to the clearing organi-
zation. In almost all cases these contracts are closed with no in-
tention of delivery by the seller or acceptance by the buyer.
Rather, the expectation of each is that prior to the maturing
of their buy-sell obligations a cancelling sale or purchase will be
effected through the clearing mechanism that is the function of
the Board of Trade. This situation occurs because most traders
"offset" their future position by acquiring an equal and opposite
position in the same future.10 Thus a seller, who is considered
to have a "short" position in the market, may acquire a buyer's
or "long" position in the market in order to avoid having to
make delivery of the commodity under the contract. The off-
setting party will pay any loss or receive any profit on the dif-
ference in price between his original futures position and his
subsequent offset. Accordingly, a long will profit if his contract
is purchased at a price higher than the cost of his original long
position. Similarly, a short will profit if his acquisition of a long
contract is at a price lower than the original cost of his short po-
sition. Traders whose position in the market is short benefit
from price declines, while traders in a long position benefit from
9. See B. Goss, THE THEORY OF FUTURES TRADING (1972); J. BAE
& 0. SAXON, COMM DITY EXCHANGES AND FUTuREs TRADING (1949); G.
HOFFMAN, FuTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODrrY MARKETS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1932). See also Memorandum of the Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago as Amicus Curiae, Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154 (8th Cir. 1971). Other literature on the regulation of commodity
exchanges includes Huebner, Corners, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDiA Or SociAL
ScIENCE 409 (E. Seligman ed. 1931); Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in
Futures, 32 ILL. L. Rsv. 155 (1937); Mehl, Objectives of Federal Regula-
tion of Commodities Exchanges, 21 J. OF FAM EcoN. (1937); Vogelson,
Tightened Regulation for Commodity Exchanges, 55 A.B.A.J. 858
(1969); Comment, 21 U. CsL L. RPrv. 94 (1953); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 171
(1963); Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 822 (1951).
10. The "offset" is recognized as an acceptable alternative to de-
livery. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S.
236, 246-48 (1905). Almost 99 per cent of the futures contracts on the
Chicago Board of Trade are offset rather than fulfilled by delivery.
Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92




The commodity futures market has several important func-
tions12 which may be disturbed by significant price fluctua-
11. Although delivery is an infrequent occurrence in futures con-
tracts, such a requirement is essential to the maintenance of a true
price relation between the commodity cash market and the futures mar-
ket. Because the shorts are able to avoid offsetting purchases from the
longs by purchasing and delivering wheat, the longs are prevented from
demanding a price higher than the actual commodity price, sometimes
called the "spot" or cash price. The delivery element in the contract
acts as a safety valve against unrealistic price pressures that do not
reflect actual supply and demand for the commodity. A scarcity of
deliverable commodity in the delivery month may adversely affect the
shorts since their inability to procure the commodity for delivery will
encourage the longs to raise their asking prices for their offsetting con-
tracts. Conversely, a glut of a deliverable commodity may threaten
the longs with delivery, thus tending to lower futures prices downward
to a point at which the shorts find it as economical to offset as to de-
liver, G. HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 275.
12. The theoretical explanation of the functions fulfilled by the
various commodity future markets is the subject of continuing investi-
gation. See G. GOLD, MODERN COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING (1971);
W. LABYS & C. GRANDER, SPECULATION, HEDGING, AND COMMODITY PRICE
FORECASTS (1970); L. VENKATARRAMAN, THE THEORY OF FuTuREs TRADING
(1965). See also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE GRAIN
TRADE, especially vols. V (1920) & VII (1926). Articles of importance in-
clude Blau, Some Aspects of the Theory of Futures Trading, 12 REV. OF
EcoN. STUDIES 1 (1944); Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in Trad-
ing on Organized Exchanges, 27 AM. EcoN. REV. 267 (1937); Working,
New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 431
(1962); Working, Futures Trading and Hedging, 43 AM. ECON. REV.
314 (1953).
There is, however, a consensus among traders and economists on
many of the functions which the market performs. First, the market
allows producers to spread the sale of seasonal crops over many months,
thus avoiding the imbalance of supply and demand which is typical of
crops having seasonal harvests. Second, futures trading provides re-
liable pricing information for persons and firms throughout the world
who buy and sell the commodity. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER
& SMITH, THE HEDGER'S HANDBOOK 17-18 (1971). The theory that hedgers
and speculators are particularly informed about the probability of price
changes is attacked in Working, New Concepts Concerning Futures
Markets, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 431, 433-35 (1962). See also Note, Federal
Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 829-30
(1951).
A third economic benefit of commodity futures is that futures con-
tracts perform an insurance function by allowing the immediate fixing
of the price of a transaction that will not be consummated until a fu-
ture date. Through a process called "hedging," the price of the com-
modity can be pegged even if the market price subsequently rises or
falls prior to the date of delivery, thus protecting buyers and sellers in
the "spot" market from price fluctuations. If a hedger makes a De-
cember purchase of grain with the intention of processing in May of the
next year, he covers his purchase with the simultaneous assumption of
short or sellers position in the May future. In May, when the hedger
sells his cash crop for processing, he simultaneously makes a purchase
1246 [Vol. 57:1243
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tions.13  In order to prevent the inadvertent creation of such
fluctuations 4 the Commodity Exchange Act directs the regula-
tion of exchanges and expressly forbids intentional practices
in the May future to offset his December short position. Such simul-
taneous and opposite transactions in the cash and futures market allow
hedgers to overcome price fluctuation by taking positions which cover
both the possibilities of price declines and price rises within the market
If the hedger's December purchase position is hurt by falling prices, his
position as a seller in the futures market is aided since he may deliver
his lower price wheat or, as is more likely, the longs will lower their
asking prices, giving the short a profit on the difference between his
original contract and the offset. Conversely, if prices rise, appreciating
the value of the hedger's wheat, the hedger will be required to pay a
proportionate increment in order to offset his short position. See Mun-
mL LYNcH, PIERCE, FERN & Sm=, supra, at 5-10; Wolff, supra note 2,
at 223.
Of course the avoidance of this risk by hedgers necessarily means
that other persons must be willing to accept it. These persons, called
"speculators," invest in commodity futures for capital appreciation.
Speculation supplies needed risk capital and also serves to allow suffi-
cient liquidity in the market to permit immediate access and egress to
buyers and sellers. At the same time, speculative capital serves to
keep various commodity markets, dealing in the same commodity but
geographically separate, from being forced out of price alignment by
unusual local conditions. See Emery, Speculation on the Stock and
Produce Exchanges of the United States, in COLUmrA UNrvERsITY, STUD-
IEs IN HISTORY, EcoNoMIcs Am PUBLIc LAw, voL VII, No. 2 (1896). The
literature of futures trading is heavily salted with discussion of the de-
sirability of speculation and its effects upon the market. J. BuE & 0.
SAXON, supra note 9. See also, T. HiERONYMOUS, EcoNoiMcS OF FUTURES
TRAD"NG 136-46 (1971). The importance of these functions is recognized
by the Congress and is discussed in the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 3.
13. For example, it impairs successful hedging, which depends on
reasonable parallel levels of price between the cash and future market.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). See 7 FEDERAL TRADE
ComvnmssioN, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 243, 248, 256 (1926). In addi-
tion, the normal flow of consignments is disturbed and speculators are
subjected to risks unrelated to supply and demand forces in the cash
market, discouraging their investment. See Testimony of Arthur R.
Marsh, former President of the New York Cotton Exchange, in Cotton
Prices, Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Agriculture and
Forestry Pursuant to S. Res. 142, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 209-211 (1928).
Finally, the artificial prices created are a burden on the public since
they form the basis for prices in the cash market. G. HoFFMIAN, supra
note 9, at 30.
14. Many efforts have been made to eliminate the fluctuations as-
sociated with squeezes. The rules of the exchange now allow up to 10
days for delivery of the product after the future market trading is
closed. This is only effective to the extent that traders are willing to
deliver at all, and the evidence indicates that mostly they are unable
and unwilling to do so. Second, price change controls allow increases
or decreases of no more than ten cents per day, thus preventing any great
variation of prices. Since price distortions may result from the unin-
tended effects of excessive speculation the Act provides that daily trad-
ing and net commitment limits be set. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1)-(2) (1970).
These limits do not prevent bona fide hedges. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (3) (1970).
1973]
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which are known to cause such fluctuations.'Ir Although many
forms of trader impact on the market are forbidden by the Act,' 0
its scope is not clear since the prohibition against "manipulation
or attempting to manipulate" commodity prices is not specifi-
cally defined and designation of activities which are proscribed
by this section has been left to administrative and judicial inter-
pretation.1 7
Cargill v. Hardin represents the CEA's second attempt to
include within the definition of the word "manipulation" the
kind of market activity known as a "squeeze."18 Senator Pope,
who managed the Commodity Exchange Bill in the Senate, de-
fined "squeeze" as follows:
Squeeze (Congestion): These are terms used to designate a
condition in maturing futures where sellers (hedgers or specu-
lators), having waited too long to close their trades, find there
are no new sellers from whom they can buy, deliverable
stocks are low, and it is too late to procure the actual commodity
elsewhere to settle by delivery. Under such circumstances, and
though the market is not cornered in the ordinary sense, traders
who are long hold out for an arbitrary price.19
A squeeze thus exists where a trader has a dominant position in
the futures market, but does not have control over the com-
modity to be delivered in satisfaction of the outstanding con-
tracts.20 A squeeze may or may not be caused by the manipula-
15. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6 & 9 (1970).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1970); see T. HERONYMOUS, supra note 12, at
297-302.
17. One of the few judicial definitions of "manipulation" is found
in General Foods v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 231 (7th Cir. 1948), where the
court said:
We are favored with numerous definitions of the word "manip-
ulation". Perhaps as good as any is one of the definitions
which appears in the government's brief, where it is defined as
"the creation of an artificial price by planned action, whether
by one man or a group of men."
The Government's brief in this case offers a definition found in Camp-
bell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 215, 234 (1958):
[A] ... manipulated price is created whenever the manipu-
lator makes the market price of a commodity, or of a futures
contract, behave in some manner in which it would not behave
if left to adjust itself to uncontrolled or uninspired supply and
demand.
Brief for Respondent, 60. Obviously such definitions have the broadest
possible application. The only safe guide to determining what is or is
not "manipulation" under the Act must be rules of practical conduct.
See infra notes 32-36.
18. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
19. 80 CONG. REc. 6089. See also 80 CONG. Rzc. 6164, 7857-7858,
8088.
20. In contrast, a corner on the market is a situation in which a
long holds a dominant future position and also controls the deliverable
[Vol. 57:12431248
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rive intent of traders, but in any event it is a situation which
produces a temporary derangement of prices.21  It is the posi-
tion of the CEA that previous judicial determinations, the gen-
eral understanding of good market practice and the legislative
history of the Act demonstrate that intentional efforts to squeeze
the market violate the Act.2 2 But this interpretation, when liti-
gated by the CEA for the first time in 1962, in Volkart Bros. v.
Freeman,23 was rejected by the Fifth Circuit.
The fact pattern of Volkart is similar to that of Cargill. Volk-
art Bros. was an experienced cotton brokerage firm which
traded in the cash and future markets for cotton. In October,
1957, Volkart held a large block of October cotton futures on the
New York Exchange. While other longs were liquidating their
interests, Volkart not only retained its New York holdings but
simultaneously made a large purchase of futures on the New Or-
leans Cotton Exchange. By October 11, Volkart was aware that
the available deliverable supply of cotton amounted to less than
one-half of Volkart's combined New York-New Orleans interest
Volkart retained its long holdings throughout October by offer-
ing to sell only at prices slightly above market. On the final
day of trading, Volkart was able to raise its prices to even higher
levels and the shorts, unable to make delivery of the commodity
itself, were forced to offset their contracts at prices which
yielded Volkart a last day profit of over $20,000.24 The court
commodity. In such a situation, the long has the shorts in a double
bind since the short must apply to the long for either the offsetting
contract or for the commodity which their contracts require them to
deliver. The long is in possession of both supply (the commodity) and
demand (the outstanding long contracts) and he may therefore require
a price which is unrelated to the normal forces of the market. One of
the most spectacular reported cases illustrating such a corner is Peto
v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938). The court found that the de-
fendant acquired 8,500,000 bushels in long corn futures for delivery in
Chicago. After 7,000,000 bushels of wheat had been delivered, consti-
tuting 97 per cent of the deliverable supply in Chicago and 90 per
cent of the deliverable supply in the entire nation, there remained
1,500,000 outstanding interests which could not be satisfied by delivery.
The settlement price of the contracts was found to be artificially high.
Recent litigation involving corners as prohibited by the Act includes
Great W. .Food Distribut., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d
286 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959). Frank Norris'
The Pit is perhaps the most famous literary example of a corner that
failed.
21. G. HorFmAN, supra note 9, at 309-18.
22. Brief for Respondent at 60-65, Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154 (8th Cir. 1972).
23. 311F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
24. Id. at 58.
19731 1249
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found that Volkart had not engaged in manipulation. It seemed
to fear that the difficulty of distinguishing squeezes from per-
missible trading activity would threaten the operation of the
futures market by generating uncertainty and reducing the flow
of speculative capital. Fundamentally, the court based its rul-
ing on a conviction that the difficulty of articulating a clear
standard of forbidden activity made it impracticable to define
market squeezes as illegal manipulation.2 5
The Cargill court, however, agreed with the CEA's view that
intentional market squeezes constitute illegal manipulation. The
court adopted the Government's conceptual framework for re-
viewing the evidence. That framework basically distinguished
the conditions necessary to a squeeze from the intention to
squeeze. The court accepted the Government's suggestion that
three principle conditions are prerequisite to a squeeze: 1) a
dominant or controlling position in the futures market; 2) an
insufficient supply of wheat available for delivery and 3) the
exaction of an artificial or abnormally high price in the liqui-
dation of contracts. 26 For the scienter requirement, the court
adopted judicially developed methods of proving intent.
First, with respect to dominance in the market, unless a long
trader has sufficient control of the outstanding future contracts
to force the shorts to accept his prices, a squeeze is impossible.
The court found that Cargill's long position of 2,000,000 bushels,
which represented sixty-two per cent of the market by the time
Cargill announced its prices, was in fact a dominant position.
To Cargill's argument that the last long out of the market is al-
ways in a dominant position, the court replied that Cargill's posi-
tion was of such magnitude that it represented "a sufficiently
controlling position to warrant consideration of the question
whether Cargill actually manipulated prices. '27
Second, proof of an insufficient supply of the deliverable
commodity is necessary to demonstrate that the short's option of
delivery in place of offsetting long contracts by purchase was
eliminated and that they were at the mercy of the controlling
long interest. The court determined that there existed suffi-
cient evidence to support the CEA's finding that there was an
insufficient supply of wheat available from sources other than
Cargill for delivery on the May future.28
25. Id. at 59.
26. 452 F.2d at 1164, 1167.
27. Id. at 1164.
28. The subsidiary question of what constitutes deliverable sup-
plies also was resolved against Cargill, who contended the shorts had
[Vol. 57:12431250
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Third, the Cargill court found that an abnormally high or
artificial price was exacted by Cargill upon liquidation of the
outstanding contracts.29 The concept of artificial price, however,
does not promote reasoned analysis and it is unclear why the
court or the government elected to rely on it Evidence offered
by the government that prices are out of alignment with their
historical pattern, or with other markets, does not explain why
those distortions occurred. Abnormal price activity may reflect
the result of natural as well as intentional squeezes; 3 0 prices are
"artificially" high only where they are manipulated. Similarly,
the alleged variance between the closing prices of the future and
the spot market prices, although evidence of market disturb-
ance, should not be treated as prima facie evidence of manipu-
available supplies which they refused to ship from other markets. The
court found that hard wheat, which could also be delivered on the con-
tract, was available for shipment to Chicago in time for the deadline but
that the CEA had acted properly in excluding it from the available
deliverable supply. The court found this to be consistent with the de-
cision in Great W. Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953). In that case, which involved egg fu-
tures, the court found that more expensive fresh eggs could not be con-
sidered as part of the supply available for delivery under future con-
tracts when cheaper local refrigerator eggs were the standard deliver-
able grade on the future. Great W. Food Distribut., Inc. v. Brannan,
supra at 480-81. By contrast, Volkart had held that cotton stocks which
would not have been considered the ordinary stock in trade of the fu-
tures market had to be considered as part of the commodity available
for delivery. 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962). Cargilt rejected the
Volkart holding on the ground that the decision in that case was
reached without consideration of the economic realities involved. 452
F.2d at 1166.
29. The government proposed four tests to determine whether the
price of the future was artificial and asserted that the price which
Cargill demanded conformed to none of the tests. First, the Govern-
ment contended that the sharp price rise in the last two days of trad-
ing was not comparable to any movement in the nine other years stud-
ied. Second, the Government demonstrated that the spread between
the price of the May future and the July future was similarly distorted,
a distortion which likewise had no historical analogue in the years
studied. Third, the Government contended that the Chicago future
price was considerably out of line with the Kansas City future price as
compared with prior years and as compared with the same year.
Cargill did not sharply dispute any of these statements. Finally, the
Government sharply debated with Cargill the question whether the
price of the future was substantially different from that of the cash
commodity. In theory, the price of the future should be approximately
24 cents to 3 cents less than the price of the cash wheat, the discount
reflecting warehouse loading charges. The court determined that the
preponderance of this final argument was in the Government's favor.
The court concluded that the "tests proposed by the Government very
clearly support the ultimate conclusion that the futures price was art-
ificially high." 452 F.2d at 1169.
30. G. HOFFmAN, supra note 9, at 309-18.
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lation. Certain inefficiencies of the market may force prices out
of their historical alignment in a manner which defeats the ex-
pectation of traders, but such prices are not per se artificial.
Unusual stresses or demands on the available supply can create
such distortions absent any form of manipulation. Moreover,
the concept of artificial price does not reach the situation where
a trader attempts to manipulate the price but is unsuccessful.
Certainly such activity is equally prohibited.3 ' While the com-
plaints of traders may be heard only in cases where the market
price pattern defeats their expectation, the trier of fact ought to
confine itself to the practical test of whether certain market
activity was engaged in by the trader with the intention of forc-
ing price moves which would not otherwise have occurred. The
success or failure of the effort should not be dispositive of the
question whether manipulation was attempted.
Finally, having demonstrated Cargill's capacity to squeeze
the May future market, the court sought to discover what inten-
tional market activity was employed by Cargill to in fact squeeze
the market. It appears that neither the court nor the CEA con-
tended that the Act prohibited Cargill from acquiring a large out-
standing long future position, or from making its Spanish sales
which created the shortage of deliverable supply.32 Rather these
actions, while perfectly legitimate in themselves, created the ca-
pacity to squeeze the market. It is, however, the leverage of in-
tentional market activity operating on such capacity, whether
gained fortuitously or intentionally, that arguably constitutes
the complex of activities which the Act's prohibition against
manipulation proscribes.
As the standard for the kind of activity forbidden by the
Act, the court adopted the practical test of ordinary market be-
havior. This objective test makes it unnecessary for traders to
engage in speculation about whether the prices they seek for
their contracts are "artificial." Rather, they need only avoid
a course of conduct which is unusual. Cargill's decision to wait
until the last fifteen minutes of trading to liquidate its large
outstanding interest was demonstrably unusual. First, a broker,
called by Cargill as a witness, testified that he "would not be
inclined to show any broker, just for the sake of his nerves, a
2,000,000 [bushel] sell order for the last 15 minutes, just for the
sake of his nerves. '33 Second, the court examined the liqui-
31. See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 171, 175.
32. 452 F.2d at 1170.
33. Id. at 1170.
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dation procedures of two major grain traders who were long
in the May futures market to determine the method by which
they took their profits. Both had liquidated their holdings over
the entire last day of trading so as "to get an average for the
day."34 Cargill's unusual market technique therefore signaled
an artificial or manipulated market force.
The practical test of normal course of dealing or ordinary
market behavior involves a comparison which is difficult to es-
tablish and which may be difficult to apply. However, it has
the advantage of looking to the market itself for good trading
practice rather than to current theories of commodity price pre-
diction which constitute an inexact science at best.35 Traders
have long been aware that the holding of a large open interest
until late in the life of the future may give a trader a dominant
position and consequent profits by taking advantage of the
shorts' unwillingness and inability to deliver.30 The normal ex-
pectation of traders includes the possibility of natural squeezes
wherein prices fluctuate from their expected levels. Although
such fluctuations may not represent actual price forces of supply
and demand for the commodity itself, they must be under-
stood as one of the inefficiencies of the futures market, one of
the costs of such an insurance operation.3 7
However, intentional efforts to aggravate such situations
need not be tolerated. The loadout of the deliverable wheat
from the Chicago area through the Spanish sales probably cre-
ated a condition of natural squeeze as evidenced by the price
rise of almost ten cents the day before trading in the May future
closed.38 Assuming that the second Spanish sale at a price of
$2.09 was a true reflection of price force realities, the price rise
to $2.18% for the May future must be considered as some sort of
squeeze phenomenon caused by the unexpected loadout of such
34. Id.
35. See note 12 supra. See also Working, New Concepts Con-
cerning Futures Markets, 52 AM. EcoN. Rnv. 431 (1962), which details the
various stages of development of economic understanding of the futures
market.
36. G. HoFFMAN, supra note 9, at 214-318.
37. See note 12 supra.
38. "[T]he prices and price movements of No. 2 soft red winter
wheat in Chicago on May 20 and 21, 1963 were artificial in that they
did not reflect basic supply and demand factors and that this artificial-
ity was brought about by the movement of wheat out of Chicago at a
time when there was an insufficient supply of deliverable grade
wheat in Chicago to satisfy the open interest, and that this situation
produced an over reaction and caused a temporary price surge." Brief
for Respondent at 80, Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1972).
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a large quantity of the commodity. Cargill's unusual method
of liquidating its long holdings constituted an additional and
"manipulative" squeeze which forced the price to a high of
$2.281/4. The shorts were properly responsible for their con-
tracts under the pressure of the first type of squeeze but not
the second squeeze caused by Cargill's delaying action, which
cannot be considered to be ordinary market activityY The
court's treatment of the problem of intent appears to be squarely
in line with the best judicial interpretation of the Act. The
line of decisions in the Seventh Circuit is instructive. In General
Foods Corporation v. Brannan,40 the court reversed an adminis-
trative finding of manipulation of rye prices, devoting its analy-
sis to the difficulty of finding direct evidence of the trader's
intention. Five years later, in Great Western Foods Distributors,
Inc. v. Brannan,1 the Seventh Circuit changed its emphasis.
Rather than requiring direct evidence of intent to manipulate,
the court examined commercial practice and other explanations
of petitioner's conduct which might tend to suggest legitimate
intention. Finding none, the court approved the administrative
finding of a corner on the egg futures market.42
In the present case, Cargill insisted that the decision to
wait until the last fifteen minutes to liquidate was an honest
judgment that the future price was unusually low, and that the
delay was intended only to procure a reasonable price. This
contention failed to consider either the market impact of Car-
gill's actions or Cargill's ability to understand the impact of its
action on the price of the future.43 Since Cargill as an exper-
ienced trader must have been aware of the inflationary effect
of holding such a large open interest until the last moment of
39. 452 F.2d at 1171-72.
40. 170 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1948).
41. 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
42. Id. at 483-84.
43. Other possible explanations for Cargill's decision which would
accord with accepted trading practice likewise fail, since Cargill's long
position was admittedly speculative. Had Cargill's holding been a
hedge against a cash market sale, its action in failing to liquidate
could have been explained by its failure to find a buyer in the cash
market. See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 171, 182 (1963). Similarly, if Cargill
had been prepared to demand delivery at the prices it eventually exacted
from the shorts, it would have known that the spot market demand
was in fact as high as the futures prices for which it sold. But the
evidence clearly showed that Cargill did not want delivery in lieu of the
prices it demanded from the shorts in the liquidation of its long posi-
tion. In fact, Cargill had refused to accept the return of certain wheat
stocks which had been purchased from it at a lower price by mistake.
452 F.2d at 1171-72.
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trading, its defense was properly rejected by the court. A per-
son is presumed to intend the consequences of his intentional
acts.
One ambiguity in the opinion was the failure to distinguish
clearly between pressure in the market caused by an actual
shortage of deliverable supply and the inflationary effect of
holding a large open interest until late in the life of the future,
each of which is known as a squeeze. It is clear that in this
case the court found only the latter kind of squeeze to be within
the prohibition of the Act. However, although the court touched
upon the problem, it did not satisfactorily resolve the question of
whether the intentional creation of a shortage of deliverable
commodity and the simultaneous assumption of a long position
in order to take advantage of the shortage falls within the pro-
hibition of the Act.44 Through its Spanish sales, Cargill vir-
tually eliminated the possibility that the shorts would be able
to make delivery and thus insured a squeeze of some dimension
from which it could make a profit. However, the court appeared
to accept the legitimacy of this conduct, arguing that if Cargill
had liquidated its holding in an "orderly fashion ... it would
still have made a handsome profit on its investment, even with-
out the added increment which its manipulation produced. 1 45
The question of a supply squeeze created by timing interna-
tional sales to take advantage of their impact on local market
brings into focus some of the chief difficulties posed by the op-
eration of international trading companies in local markets.46
If large grain traders are able to make foreign sales at less than
optimum prices by assuming long positions in the expectation
of resulting squeezes on deliverable commodities, they can in ef-
fect subsidize the foreign sale from small traders and speculators
through the intentional creation and exploitation of a commod-
ity shortage. The issue here must be distinguished from mere
rises in prices caused by foreign sales which deplete the total
supply of the nation's wheat. Where sales are so timed that it
44. The court noted that Volkart may be distinguished from Car-
gill by the fact that, in the latter, Cargill created the shortage of which
it took advantage. However, the significance of this distinction was
not developed. 452 F.2d at 1172 n.15. The court refused to endorse the
idea that foreign sales were the source of "artificiality." Rather, the
court limited itself to examination of Cargill's delaying tactic by com-
paring it with the action of other traders who were long in the May
future. 452 F.2d at 1169-70. See notes 33-34 supra.
45. 452 F.2d at 1173.
46. 3 FEDERAL TRADE CommIssIoN, REPORT ON ThE GRAIN TRAD 135-50
(1920).
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is too late to cover short positions by moving grains into the
local delivery area from outside markets, the shorts are paying
for a manipulative finesse of the market. Such intentional
squeeze activity in either the spot or the cash market is func-
tionally equivalent to a corner.47  Although the trader liter-
ally does not control the cash market, as is usually the case with
corners, his sales effectively preclude control by other traders
and his dominant position in the future market gives him an
advantageous position with respect to the shorts. However, the
difficulties of enforcing any prohibition against such activities
are far greater than with domestic corners. Indeed, such a pro-
hibition would have highly undesirable effects. Prohibiting
traders who intend to make major sales from taking any specula-
tive position, or placing upon them the burden of proof of good
faith would severely hamper speculative activity. Prohibiting
traders from extending their long position after making major
sales as well as prohibiting traders with large long positions
from making sales would severely hamper trading. However,
the regulatory authority granted the CEA by the Act for the
control of speculation can help to eliminate such strategies. 48
A reduction of the size of the maximum allowable speculative
limit on the exchange would diminish the attractivensss of such
activity.4 9 Secondly, the Department of Agriculture should be-
gin to devise new ways to publish news and developments of po-
tential foreign grain customers. The expansion of world popu-
lation almost certainly means an increase of foreign grain sales
with a corresponding pressure on local markets. The absence
of some comon level of information puts smaller traders and
speculators at a decided disadvantage. Finally, the institution
of a series of premiums for wheats of better grade and class
which are deliverable under the contract would enlarge the cate-
gories of wheat economically feasible for delivery"0 and sub-
stantially reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility of squeezes in
the wheat future market.
47. See note 20 supra.
48. See note 14 supra.
49. A corner in rye futures resulted in the downward revision of
the speculative limits in the rye commodities exchange. Moore v.
Brannan, 191 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
See Wolff, supra note 2, at 230. The original recommendation of the
Federal Trade Commission would have limited the maximum specula-
tive position to only 1,000,000 bushels. 7 FEDERAL TRADE CoMmissION, RE-
PORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 294 (1926).
50. This is the suggestion of the court. 452 F.2d at 1173.
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